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In this paper we conduct a multi-criteria analysis (MCA) from a multiple stakeholder
point of view for the design of access and benefit sharing (ABS) agreements concerning
genetic resources, in particular regarding the access component of such agreements.
We start by analyzing the objectives defined by international law (viz. the Convention
on Biodiversity and the Nagoya Protocol) that every party (i.e., all United Nations
member states, except the United States) must strive to attain when developing
national legislation on ABS. As countries have a certain degree of freedom concerning
the way and the extent to which they need to integrate these objectives into their
national frameworks and since stakeholders attach different levels of importance to
these objectives, such an MCA will help identify those options that command the
highest value added from the community of stakeholders. Consequently, those options
are expected to hold the highest potential for successful implementation. The MCA
performed in this paper is based on Saaty’s analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and starts
from the objectives (i.e., criteria) enshrined in international law, and then proceeds
by assessing the relative importance of these criteria from the point of view of four
different stakeholder groups (industrial users, academic users, collections and provider
countries). The alternatives to be evaluated in the MCA are based upon options
discussed qualitatively in our previous study published in Frontiers in Plant Science
(2019b). These options are now transformed into “design parameters” and are evaluated
in terms of their contribution to stakeholder criteria. This evaluation is now performed in
a quantitative way using MCA and is based on previous qualitative discussions with
stakeholders that have been reported qualitatively in our previous paper in Frontiers
in Plant Science referred to above. The final result of our MCA consists of pointing
out which design parameters regarding access obtain the highest priority from the
community of stakeholders and hence need to be present in national regulatory
frameworks on ABS that will be implemented by member states. It is our intention to
undertake similar research for the Benefit Sharing component of ABS agreements in
the future.
Keywords: access and benefit sharing agreements, genetic resources, multi-criteria analysis, stakeholder
analysis
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INTRODUCTION
Genetic resources (GR) constitute a crucial source of provisioning
ecosystem services (The Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity, 2010). On top of being used within the field
of academic research, GR are utilized by many industries such
as agriculture, food industry, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, energy
(Laird and Wynberg, 2018).
Natural product research dates back to the 18th century when
systematic explorations begun when the newly found species
were appropriated by European colonial powers and shipped
to Europe where they were used as herbs, food and medicine.
During the colonial period, compensation schemes between the
explorers and locals sharing their knowledge on the use of these
species were completely non-existent (Pistorius, 1997).
The value of GR has received a second boost since the
70s from modern biotechnology. Its economic value created a
strong incentive to apply patents on inventions resulting from
the use of GR. Since patenting is a rather costly procedure,
patents on inventions resulting from the use of GR were
mostly held by companies in developed countries. With the
majority of the world’s biodiversity being present in developing
countries and use of these GR being mainly undertaken
by companies and institutions in developed countries, the
perception of imbalance thereof led to discussions on fair and
equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of GR
(Oberthür and Rosendal, 2014).
The present system of access and benefit-sharing of GR
(ABS) aims to balance the rights of provider countries (or
simply “providers”) through the equitable sharing of benefits,
and those of the users. Ultimately, ABS could increase the value
of biodiversity, for users as a resource for R&D, as well as
for providers as a source of benefits that create incentives for
biodiversity conservation.
1ABS has been introduced to the international legal forum,
starting from 1992 with the Convention on Biological Diversity
[CBD] (1992). The most recent international legal instrument
on ABS is the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits arising from their
Utilization (Nagoya Protocol, 2011), which came into force in
2014. Additionally, a specialized instrument, the International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGRFA), deals with many of the core plant genetic resources
to be used for breeding purposes. The multilateral system (MLS)’s
legacy under the ITPGRFA is seen as jeopardized due to the
fact that the Parties have not reached a consensus especially
regarding the provision of the Digital Sequence Information
(DSI) and the revision of the benefit-sharing rates under the
Standard Material Transfer Agreement (sMTA) in their 9th Ad
Hoc Open-Ended Working Group, which was the last one to
have received a mandate. In addition, some countries already
stipulated that they may regulate PGRFA under Annex I under
domestic ABS measures. For instance, during the 8th Meeting
of the Governing Body of the ITPGRFA in November 2019,
Zambia stated that since there is no progress on benefit-
sharing in the Treaty, Africa may explore regulating DSI related
to PGRFA within the MLS under national ABS measures
(IISD, 2019).
The provisions of the CBD originate from its overarching
three-pillar objective which consists of: (1) conservation of
biological diversity, (2) sustainable use of the components of
biodiversity and (3) fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising
from GR. Therefore, the importance of the ABS system enshrined
in the Nagoya Protocol as well as the CBD is increasing for plant
genetic resources under the ITPGRFA.
Article 15 of the CBD reaffirms the states’ sovereign rights over
their GR. This means that states have the right to regulate access
to their GR, which includes the right to determine the conditions
of such access and the fair and equitable benefit-sharing resulting
from the utilization of GR (Kamau and Winter, 2013).
Regarding ABS in national jurisdiction, international law by
means of the CBD and the NP puts in place general goals
and principles for states to implement. Currently, every United
Nations Member State except for the United States is a party
to the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD], 2018).
The NP on the other hand currently has 123 Parties; a number
which is expected to increase (Convention on Biological Diversity
[CBD], 2011).
ABS is currently a rapidly developing and evolving field that is
shaped by the national implementation by the Parties concerned,
which determines how ABS goals are realized and how ABS
principles are formed within regulatory mechanisms.
The current perception regarding the operationalization of
ABS is that the system of national implementation brings
complexities for both academic and industrial users of GR
as well as collections (such as natural history museums,
botanical gardens) which result in less willingness to access GR
(Koester, 2012; Watanabe, 2015; Lassen, 2016; Overmann and
Scholz, 2016). Users commonly list the lack of legal certainty,
inconsistency in ABS systems, reputational risk and investment
uncertainty as the main reasons for concern (UNCTAD, 2017).
Less access would inevitably result in fewer benefits shared and
this vicious cycle would jeopardize the success of the entirety
of the ABS system.
The overarching reason why ABS implementation is neither
beneficial for the providers nor for the users is that the provider
countries fail to implement an adequate institutional framework
that is consistent with the international ABS goals and therefore
implementation does not fulfill the objectives of the international
ABS framework. This inevitably jeopardizes access to GR as
well as benefit-sharing and thus damages trust between the
provider and the user.
AIM OF THIS PAPER AND
METHODOLOGY APPLIED
Aim of This Paper
Our previous research (Sirakaya, 2019a,b) aimed at identifying
and evaluating international ABS goals and regulatory options
that have the highest potential to create an adequate institutional
framework able to address the above-mentioned problem. In
Sirakaya (2019a) we identified and analyzed international goals
that establish the general principles of the international ABS
frameworks. In Sirakaya (2019b) we took an evaluative approach
by subjecting the identified common regulatory options to
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stakeholder interviews. Our present research reported here aims
to identify stakeholder opinions regarding the current ABS
framework and to design novel types of ABS framework that
better fit with the preferences of the stakeholders involved and
that are at the same time in line with international ABS goals.
Consequently, the novel types of ABS frameworks designed
in this way will be associated with an increased chance of
successful implementation.
Methodology Used in This Paper
Stakeholder-Driven MCA
To address the research objectives defined in section “Aim
of This Paper” we will conduct a multi-criteria analysis
(MCA). This MCA will be designed so that it can play
the role of an “institution in action” as described in De
Brucker et al. (2013). Institutions can be defined as “the rules
of the game in a society” (North, 1990:3) or as “decision
procedures,” i.e., a set of rules that enable a group or society to
transform individual (or stakeholder) preferences into collective
preferences. The essence of economics is – according to
Commons (1934/1959) traditional institutionalist definition –
to solve or at least manage social conflicts so as to increase
economic welfare. Here, conflict among stakeholders’ interests
may enhance creativity, value-focused thinking (Keeney, 1996)
and constructivism, i.e., the act of looking for better or more
efficient solutions. It is from the clash of ideas that true
insight can spring (cf. the quote by French writer Boileau,
1636–1711, “du choc des idées jaillit la lumière”). MCA can
be viewed as an institution in action creating momentum to
achieve this goal.
Hence, stakeholders will play a crucial role in this MCA.
According to Freeman (1984), stakeholders are defined as
“any individual or group who can affect an organization’s
performance or who is affected by the achievement of this
organization’s objectives.” The idea of integrating stakeholder
points of view in an MCA was first developed by Macharis
(2005) and Macharis et al. (2007) through so-called “multi-
actor multi-criteria analysis” (MAMCA), and the idea of using
it as a tool for intentional design (following a two-step
procedure) to evolve institutional frameworks or implement new
technology came from De Brucker et al. (2011, 2013, 2014,
2015).
Looking into regulatory issues related to ABS, we have
identified four key stakeholders: the government (as the
provider), collections, academic users and industrial users. These
have been identified in line with Freeman’s definition. These
key stakeholders’ involvement in regulatory processes is vital to
forming an ABS system that is effective and efficient and that
attends to the international ABS goals (Swiderska, 2001). In other
words, the stakeholders identified for this study are either the
regulators or the subjects of the regulation.
Construction of a Value Structure Including
Stakeholders, Criteria, Design Parameters
The value structure is shown in Figure 1. The top level represents
the focus, i.e., the overall objective, namely generating societal
benefits by designing adequate agreements to obtain access to GR.
At the second level the stakeholders (s) are shown. Here four
main groups of stakeholders have been identified as “industrial
users” (such as pharmaceutical companies, food/feed industry),
“academic users” (such as universities), “collections” (such as
natural history museums, botanical gardens) and “providers” or
“provider states” (i.e., countries like Brazil and India that are
home to a rich pool of GR). The level below the stakeholders (i.e.,
level 3) comprises the criteria that these stakeholders consider
relevant. The degree to which these criteria are relevant for
the different stakeholder groups is reflected in the weights
(or priorities) of the criteria. These weights will be derived
below (in section “Building Consensus Among Stakeholder
Representatives’ Scorings”). The set of 11 criteria shown at level
3 of the criteria tree has been constructed based on our previous
research (Sirakaya, 2019b) on identifying international ABS goals
embedded in international documents on ABS such as CBD,
NP and related decisions of the Conference of the Parties to
both CBD and NP (i.e., COP Decisions). An analysis of these
documents showed that there are 11 ABS goals that are prescribed
by these documents. Hence, these goals must be fulfilled by
the parties through their national ABS frameworks and the
regulatory mechanisms installed in national ABS frameworks
must be consistent with these goals. These goals, which are listed
below, have, therefore, been operationalized as the criteria shown
on level 3 of Figure 1.
C1: Predictable conditions (NP Preamble).
C2: Legal certainty (NP Article 6, COP Decision V/26, VII/19,
VIII/4).
C3: Transparency (NP Article 6, COP Decision V/26).
C4: Fairness and equity in negotiations (NP, COP Decision
V/26).
C5: Sustainable use of biodiversity components (CBD Article
1, NP Preamble, Article 8, Article 9, COP Decisions V/26
and VII/19).
C6: Cost-effective measures (NP Article 6, COP Decisions
VII/19, VIII/4).
C7: Scientific research based on GR (CBD Article 15.6).
C8: Strengthening the ability of Indigenous People and Local
Communities to benefit from the use of traditional
knowledge (NP Articles 5, 6, 7, 12, 21, 22,/COP Decision
V/26, VI/24).
C9: Tech transfer and cooperation to build research and
innovation capacity in developing countries (NP, COP
Decisions VIII/4, VII/19 VI/24, V/26).
C10: Creating incentives to conserve biodiversity (CBD Article
11, COP Decision VI/24, NP Preamble).
C11: Innovative solutions for transboundary situations (NP
Preamble and Article 11).
When developing this set of criteria special attention has been
given to the technical conditions or requirements for a consistent
family of criteria (Roy, 1996, pp. 216–219, Belton and Stewart,
2002, pp. 55–58. The criteria subject to this study are assumed
to be exhaustive. All of them derive from international legal
documents on ABS which are a result of extensive stakeholder
input and consultation. Furthermore, we asked stakeholders
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FIGURE 1 | Value structure for the overall benefits to be derived from the design of access agreements to GR (Own design).
whether more criteria should be considered, and whether any
additional goals should be considered. In terms of relevance,
as these criteria were internationally agreed and need to be
addressed in national laws, their relevance for the regulator and
the subject of the regulation is salient.
The non-redundancy of the criteria has also been
checked. The authors initially identified a 12th criterion
(workability/operational functionality) yet decided to drop it
since the conjunction of several criteria (cost-effectiveness, legal
certainty and predictability) made the 12th criterion redundant.
This check also contributed to the simplicity of the criteria set.
TABLE 1 | Pairwise comparison mechanism in the AHP.
cj a1 . . . ai ′ . . . an
a1 1
. . . [1]
ai Pgj(ai,ai ′ )
. . . [1]
an 1
Comprehensibility of the criteria has been ensured by
subjecting it to stakeholder review where they were asked to
explain what they understand from the wording of the objectives.
The criteria satisfy judgmental independence as a
stakeholder’s perception of them does not depend on
another criterion. For instance, a stakeholder does not
exhibit preference dependence between “predictable
conditions for ABS” and “transparency” meaning that
the stakeholder’s perception on one will not depend on
the other.
The lowest level in the hierarchy shown in Figure 1
(i.e., level 4) contains the actual regulatory options (or
alternatives) to be evaluated. Here the options are to be
seen as design parameters (DP). The aim of the MCA
here is to assess which particular ways of designing ABS
systems command the highest priority from the different
stakeholders. More details about the specific features of
these regulatory options are described in Sirakaya (2019b).
A description follows.
For instance, regarding the material scope (DP1), three
different options are possible, namely “in situ access only,” “in situ
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and ex situ access” and “in situ access, but ex situ access for
DSI.” With “in situ access only,” a permit or notification is only
required when access happens within the geographical borders of
the provider country. In the event of “in situ and ex situ access,”
a permit or notification is also required when access takes place
through biodiversity biobanks (that contain biological samples)
outside the geographical borders of the provider country. The
third option also covers ex situ access to the digital sequence
information (DSI), which is often referred to as the DNA
sequence data of the GR that is downloadable from public
databases. Here it should be noted that there currently is no
unified definition of DSI both in the legal and scientific realm.
Regarding the temporal scope (DP2) three options are
possible. With “access for sampling” the access requirements need
to be triggered before the material is sampled in situ or obtained
from an ex situ source. In the event of “access for utilization”
the user first needs to obtain the ability to perform R&D. In the
event of “access to previously utilized genetic resource for new
utilization,” this requirement also needs to be triggered when a
new utilization activity occurs with a genetic resource that was
previously made available to the user.
As regards the utilization scope (DP3), the option “research”
implies that access is only permitted for research purposes.
With the option “development” access is permitted for
product or process development purposes. Under the
option “research and development” access is permitted
for both purposes.
In terms of benefit sharing agreements (BSA) (DP4), two
options are possible. The can be either mandatory or non-
mandatory.
Regarding the regulatory mechanism (DP5), the access can
be subject to either a permit or a mere notification. In the
latter case the user can commence activities without having to
wait for approval.
Regarding the granting authority (DP6), either a single
centralized institution can be made responsible or several
decentralized institutions can be mandated according
to the type of GR.
Regarding standardization (DP7), the provider country can
either opt for standardizing the access procedure or apply various
conditions on a case-by-case basis.
Making an agreement with a local partner (DP8) can either be
a prior requirement or not.
Furthermore, access for non-commercial research (DP9) can
be facilitated or not.
And finally, the access agreement may be subject to
renegotiation (DP10) when the user changes or when
the intent changes.
Consequently, at this stage of the analysis, it is these options
(i.e., the options within the different DPs) that need to be
TABLE 2 | Pairwise comparison scale in the AHP (Source: Saaty, 1995, p. 73).
Intensity of
importance
Pgj(ai,ai′ ) Definition Explanation
1 Both elements have equal importance Both elements contribute equally to the criterion considered
3 Moderately higher importance of row element
(RE) as compared to column element (CE)
Experience and judgment reveal a slight preference of row element (RE) over column element (CE)
5 Higher importance of RE as compared to CE Experience and judgment reveal a strong preference of RE over CE
7 Much higher importance of RE as compared
to CE
RE is very strongly favored over CE, and its dominance has been demonstrated in practice
9 Complete dominance in terms of importance
of RE over CE
The evidence favoring RE over CE is of the highest possible order
2, 4, 6, 8 (Intermediate values) Intermediate position between two assessments
1/2, 1/3, 1/4,. . . 1/9 (reciprocals) When CE is compared with RE, it receives the reciprocal value of the RE/CE comparison
Rationals If consistency were to be forced by obtaining n numerical values to span the matrix
Ratios arising from the scale
1.1–1.9 RE and CE are nearly indistinguishable; moderate is 1.3 and extreme is 1.9
For tied activities
TABLE 3 | Pairwise comparison of score categories and corresponding ratio values.
Part A: Pairwise comparison of score categories Part B: Corresponding ratio values
Sk ++ + 0 – – – Sk Ratio value scale
++ 1 3 5 7 9 ++ 0.527
+ 1 2 5 7 + 0.249
0 1 2 3 0 0.118
– 1 2 – 0.065
– – 1 – – 0.041
IC = 0.02
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evaluated and prioritized. Hence, comparisons or prioritizations
of combinations of options across DPs (e.g., comparing “in situ
access” to e.g., “access for utilization”) are not made at this stage.
The Choice of the AHP-MCA
The actual MCA technique will that will be used to obtain
the priorities of the criteria and finally also those of the
alternatives (regulatory options, or in MCA terminology; design
parameters) is the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) of Saaty
(1977, 1986, 1988, 1995). The AHP method has been chosen
for several reasons. The first reason is that AHP makes it
possible to decompose a complex decision-making problem into
its constituent parts. When treated separately these often are less
complex to manage. The hierarchy shown in Figure 1 visualizes
how the DM problem has been decomposed into its constituent
parts. Each arrow in Figure 1 represents a causal relationship.
For instance, the 11 arrows that point from the stakeholder
“Industrial users” (on level 2) to the 11 criteria (on level 3)
indicate that these criteria (or more precisely the scores obtained
by the alternatives on those criteria) contribute to the objectives
of the stakeholder “Industrial users.” Likewise, the three arrows
that link the criterion “Predictability” (C1) with the three options
for design parameter “Material scope” (DP1), namely “in situ
access,” “in situ, ex situ access” and “in situ, ex situ access for
DSI” also represent causal relationships in the sense that each of
the latter options contributes to the realization of the criterion
“Predictability.” But each option of each design parameter also
contributes to each of the 11 criteria (on level 3). For instance,
the 11 arrows that link “in situ access” with the criteria C1. . .C11
indicate that “in situ access” contributes to the realization of each
of these 11 criteria. In order not to overload the figure with
arrows, the latter type of arrows have not been drawn up to
their full length.
Another reason why we chose the AHP is that the final
decision can be constructed step by step, using an interactive
procedure based on input from stakeholders, policymakers and
experts. The evaluative approach followed here is clearly a
constructivist one that facilitates learning during the DM process.
In fact, the evaluations (pairwise comparisons) that take place
within each constituent part of the hierarchy (shown in Figure 1)
are synthesized using a step-by-step procedure so as to obtain a
final ranking (priorities) of the options studied. This is the case
not only for the calculation of the priorities of the alternatives (or
here: the options for the design parameters or regulatory options)
in terms of the criteria, but also for deriving the weights of the
criteria. The latter are furthermore determined endogenously,
based on input from stakeholders or policymakers.
Given the hierarchical decomposition of the DM problem,
the priorities of the final solutions can be calculated from the
perspective of each single stakeholder. The priorities obtained in
this way can form the basis for the construction of a solution
(in this case the design of particular types of access frameworks)
that contributes to the objectives of the different stakeholders.
Very important here is the degree of compatibility between
the stakeholder priorities. Stakeholders are seen here as the
critical (f)actors that determine whether a solution (here a
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in practice or not. If the compatibility between stakeholder
priorities is low, the potential of the solution to be accepted
by all stakeholders and hence to make possible successful and
sustainable access to GR may be problematic. The aim of the
MCA developed here is to identify those solutions that have
potential and those that have not. If the MCA shows that
some solutions do not have the required potential, but that
this is due to some specific reasons (as shown by the scores
on the criteria), then at a second stage, the potential of these
solutions may be enhanced through project redesign (De Brucker
et al., 2015). This means that a better alternative may be
constructed by remedying (or compensating) the weaknesses of
the initial alternative or by adapting the legal or institutional
framework (i.e., reducing the threats or transforming them
into opportunities).
Another important advantage of the AHP-MCA is that the
AHP makes it possible to take into account heterogeneous
information (both quantitative and qualitative) and to integrate
it into the DM process. Particularly as regards the design of
ABS frameworks, a lot of the information (i.e., the scores on the
criteria) will be qualitative.
Finally, the AHP makes it possible to obtain a complete
ranking of all the solutions and to calculate the logical consistency
of all the pairwise comparisons on which the final priorities for
the solutions are based.
The Use of the Pairwise Comparison Mechanism in
AHP (in General)
In each subsystem of the AHP (i.e., each system formed by the
higher level element and all the lower level elements with which
a causal relation exists) pairwise comparisons need to be made
to derive the relative priorities of all the lower level elements
in terms of their contribution to the higher level elements. This
is done using a pairwise comparison matrix (A) as shown in
Table 1. For each pair of elements (e.g., the actions ai and ai")
the DM has to assign a value to the relative importance of one
action (ai) as compared to another action (ai ′ ) in terms of its
contribution to a higher level objective or criterion (cj), as shown
in Table 1. The value Pgj(ai,ai ′ ) expresses the DM’s intensity of
preference for the row element (i.e., the element to the extreme
left of the row, in this case ai) as compared to the column
element (i.e., the element on top of the column, in this case
ai ′ ) in terms of its contribution to the higher level element (i.e.,
the element mentioned in cell at the intersection of the first
column and the first row of the matrix, in this case the criterion
cj). This procedure is repeated at each level of the hierarchy,
and hence is used for the prioritization of the actions (i.e.,
comparing the actions in pairs in terms of their contribution to
the criteria to which they contribute) as well for the prioritization
or weighting of the criteria (i.e., comparing the criteria in pairs
in terms of their contribution the higher level stakeholder’s
objectives). A computer program called ExpertChoice can be
used for this purpose.
The intensities of preference, i.e., the values Pgj(ai,ai ′ ), are
expressed on a fundamental scale (i.e., the so-called Saaty scale),
ranging from 1 to 9 (Saaty, 1995, p. 73). A qualitative (semantic)
label is associated with each value on this scale as shown in
Table 2. The values from this scale may also be conceived as
estimates of ratios (even for intangible effects).
On the basis of the numerical information associated with
these statements, relative priorities or weights are calculated
using the eigenvector method. Mathematically the relative
priorities, i.e., the weight vector (W), is given as the right
eigenvector (W) corresponding to the highest eigenvalue (λmax)
as shown in Eq. 1. The matrix A (in Eq. 1) is the matrix containing
all the pairwise comparisons and corresponds with Table 1.
A ·W = λmax ·W (1)
In order to synthesize all local priorities, the various priority
vectors (W) are weighted according to the global priorities of the
parent criteria and synthesized. One starts from the top and by
doing so, the final/global relative priorities for the lowest level
elements (i.e., the actions) are obtained.
In each matrix, a number of pairwise comparisons are
redundant, since the preference intensity of action a compared
to action c (in terms of their contribution to criterion gj) should,









C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11
Part A: Providers’ Perspecve Part B: Academic Users’ Perspecve Part C: Collecons’ Perspecve Part D: Industrial Users’ Perspecve
C1: Predictable conditions; C2: Legal certainty; C3: Transparency; C4: Fairness and equity in negotiations; C5: Sustainable use of biodiversity components;
C6: Cost-effective measures. C7: Scientific research based on GR; C8: Strengthening the ability of Indigenous People and Local Communities to benefit from
the use of traditional knowledge. C9: Tech transfer and cooperation to build research and innovation capacity in developing countries; C10: Creating incentives to
conserve biodiversity. C11: Innovative solutions for transboundary situations.


























































A. In situ access ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ 0 0 + +
B. In situ + ex situ access ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ + + 0 ++ +
C. In situ, ex situ + for DSI + + 0 −− −− −− −− 0 0 0 0
DP2: Temporal Scope
A. Access for sampling + + + − 0 −− −− 0 0 0 0
B. Access for utilization ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
C. Access to previously obtained GR for new utiliz. ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
DP3: Utilization Scope
A. Research ++ ++ + + + − −− + + + 0
B. Development ++ ++ ++ + 0 ++ ++ 0 0 0 0
C. Res. & Development 0 + + + 0 0 − + + + 0
DP4: Conditions of access (mandatory BSA)
A. Yes ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ − 0 + + + 0
B. No ++ ++ ++ + + 0 0 0 0 0 0
DP5: Regulatory mechanism
A. Notification-based access + 0 + + 0 ++ ++ 0 0 0 0
B. Permit-based access ++ ++ ++ + + 0 + + + 0 0
DP6: Granting authority
A. Centralized single instit. ++ ++ ++ ++ 0 ++ 0 0 0 0 0
B. Several instit. mandated according to type of GR 0 + + + 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
DP7: Standardization
A. Standardized ++ ++ ++ 0 0 ++ 0 0 0 0 0
B. Case by case ++ ++ ++ ++ 0 + 0 0 0 0 0
DP8: Mandatory Local partner
A. Yes + + + + 0 −− 0 + + + 0
B. No ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ 0 0 0 0 0
DP9: Facilitated access for non-commercial research
A. Yes ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ 0 0 0 0 0
B. No + + + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DP10: Renegotiability
A. When user changes ++ ++ ++ ++ 0 + + 0 0 0 0
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FIGURE 2 | Prioritization of DP1 options (Material scope). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view, (D) collections
point of view.
in the event of complete consistency of all pairwise comparisons
within the same matrix, equal the product of the preference
intensities of action a compared to action b and the preference
intensity of action b compared to c, as shown by Eq. 2.









However, this redundancy is used for two purposes, namely to
neutralize estimation errors that may have occurred in other
pairwise comparisons of the same matrix (in fact information
is being accumulated using multiple/redundant measurements)
and to check the consistency of all pairwise comparisons within
one matrix. According to Saaty (1985, p. 81) a limited amount of
inconsistency is quite natural and does not pose a problem as long
as the inconsistency ratio (ICR) does not exceed 10% (i.e., 0.10).
In some cases, the number of pairwise comparisons to be made
in the AHP may become quite large. However, when for instance
regarding the evaluation of the actions in terms of the higher-
level criteria, information or scores expressed on a ratio scale that
has the properties of a cardinal value function is available (or can
be constructed), then this information can be used directly to
derive the relative priorities. In that case pairwise comparisons
are not necessary for that part or subsystem of the hierarchy.
When an underlying cardinal value function exists, this means
for instance that an action that obtains a score x times as high
on this scale as another action is also considered to be associated
with a utility (or value) level that is also x times as high as the
other action. This can be the case for instance for a criterion like
“public expenditure.” A project that requires a level of public
expenditure e.g., three times as low as another project can be
considered to be three times as good (in terms of utility) as
the other project. Not all ratio scales possess this property. For
instance, as far as the criterion “salary” is concerned, a candidate
evaluating different job offers will not necessarily consider a job
paying a monthly salary of €6,000 to be twice as good as a job
with a salary of €3,000, ceteris paribus. The reason is that there
is decreasing marginal utility of income for an individual. In the
former example (public expenditure) utility of income may not be
decreasing because of the societal perspective taken. Also ordinal
scales such as ++/+/0/−/−− do not necessarily possess this
utility. This means that in that case pairwise comparisons will be
necessary. However, some techniques can be used to transform
these scales into ratio scales with underlying cardinal value
properties, for instance by making the pairwise comparisons in
terms of value or utility levels only once, but at the level of the
score categories (as will be explained below).
Evaluation of ABS Systems Based on Pairwise AHP
Comparisons
General
In order to obtain relative priorities (weights) for the criteria
shown on level 3 of the hierarchy (in Figure 1), stakeholder
representatives have been surveyed.
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FIGURE 3 | Prioritization of DP2 options (Temporal scope). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view, (D) collections
point of view.
Each group of stakeholders (academic users, industrial users,
providers countries and collections) were asked to rank on a
five-point scale the international ABS goals explained in section
“Conclusions” of this paper, according to the perceived impact
on their daily operations with regards to GR. This survey was
conducted between March 13, 2018 and April 30, 2018 and
was sent to over 600 stakeholders including all of the national
competent authorities of parties to the CBD, all of the national
focal points, academic institutions, collections and industrial
users worldwide. The selection of the stakeholders is based on
their role in their institution as well as their demonstrated
interest in ABS (published articles, their position and expertise,
attendance at conferences, workshops or discussions related to
ABS). The survey has received 220 responses in total with 92
responses from providers, 60 from academic users, 31 from
industrial users and 37 from collections. Even though the
number of participants is not homogenously divided between
the stakeholder groups, the answers of a strongly represented
stakeholder group (e.g., provider countries) did not have an
impact on the overall result in comparison to a group with fewer
responses. This is because four individual surveys were created
for each stakeholder group (e.g., academic users).
The survey is designed as separate blocks for each stakeholder
in order to ease the process of delineating and processing
data into units (Elliott and Timulak, 2005). It consists of four
questions for each stakeholder group, two of them asking
various stakeholders to rank the importance of international
ABS goals. Questions 1 and 2 ask stakeholders to rank the
importance of international ABS goals for “access” (question 1)
and “benefit-sharing” (question 2) to GR on a scale of 1 to 5
by means of qualitative categorizing (very important, important,
no effect, unimportant, very unimportant). Question 3 asks
whether the stakeholder thinks more goals should be included
at the international level. Question 4 asks if the stakeholder is
available for an in-depth interview. The qualitative indication of
importance on a five-point scale assists this study in defining
stakeholders’ priority setting per ABS goal.
The survey did not request the names or contact details of the
stakeholders except for question 4 in order to preserve anonymity
to avoid socially desirable answers (Gosen, 2014).
The stakeholder interview has been designed in a semi-
structured manner. The questions on access and compliance
asked stakeholders to rank their preference per regulatory option
on a scale of 1 to 3 with 1 being the most favorable and 3
being the least favorable. The questions on benefit-sharing asked
the stakeholders to rank the impact (from very positive to very
negative) and burden (from burden to very heavy burden) of
engaging in the given monetary or non-monetary option.
As the number criteria is quite high (11), the number of
pairwise comparisons to be made becomes quite large as well.
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FIGURE 4 | Prioritization of DP3 options (Utilization scope). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view,
(D) collections point of view.
In an 11 by 11 matrix a total of 55 pairwise comparisons may
need to be made (for the diagonal and the lower triangle of the
matrix no pairwise comparisons need to be made as the lower
triangle values are the reciprocal of the upper triangle values
and the diagonal line refers to comparisons between identical
elements, which always have value 1). In addition, the number
of stakeholder representatives is also quite large. Therefore,
one of the techniques referred to in section “The Use of the
Pairwise Comparison Mechanism in AHP (in General)” to obtain
a cardinal value function has been used. To derive the criterion
weights, the various stakeholder representatives were asked to
score the importance of the criteria to them on a five-point
ordinal scale (viz.++/+/0/−/−−), whereby “++” corresponds
to “very important,” “+” to “important,” “0” to “no effect or
neither important, nor unimportant,” “−” to “low importance”
and “−−“ to “very low importance.” To make possible ratio scale
comparisons and derive AHP-like relative priorities, this ordinal
scale has been transformed into a ratio scale using pairwise
comparisons at the level of the score categories. This is shown
in Table 3, Part A. This needs to be done only once, namely at
the level of the score categories and not for each pair of criteria.
This technique reduces the number of pairwise comparisons to
be made drastically.
For instance, the value 7 (cell shaded in Table 3, Part A)
expresses the idea that the element to the left of the row,
in short the “row element” (++) conveys a “much higher
importance” than the element on top of the column, in short
the column element (–). This means that when an element
that scores “++” on the ordinal scale used in the survey is
compared to an element that scores “–“ in the same survey, the
former element is considered to be five times more preferable
than the latter.
The values in Table 3 (Part A) have been carefully selected.
When two of the lower score categories that are close to each
other are compared (e.g., “–” and “– –”) a low value on the
Saaty scale was given (score 2, which represents a hesitation
or compromise between “equal importance” and “moderately
higher importance”). But when two adjacent scores of the
higher score categories (e.g., “++” and “+”) are compared
a slightly higher value on the Saaty scale was given (score
3, i.e., “slightly higher importance”). The score difference
between “++” and “+” is assumed to be higher than the
score difference between “–” and “– –.” When two extreme
scores are compared (e.g., “++” and “– –”), then a very high
value on the Saaty scale was given (value 9 corresponding
with an “extreme dominance” of the row element over the
column element).
The ratio value scale comparisons that result from this
comparison at the level of the score categories (++,+, 0, –, – –)
are calculated as the right eigenvector corresponding to the
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FIGURE 5 | Prioritization of DP4 options (Conditions of access). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view,
(D) collections point of view.
highest eigenvalue as outlined in Eq. 1. The results are presented
in Table 3, Part B.
Building consensus among stakeholder representatives’
scorings
Since we surveyed quite a large number of representatives for
each stakeholder, the scores (or importance levels) for the criteria
as expressed on the five-point ordinal scale referred to above
differ from each other to some extent. The ideal situation is
that the various stakeholder representatives would achieve a
consensus on the final importance level to be given to the 11
criteria. Such a consensus might be obtained when all these
representatives gathered for a meeting. But since the number
of representatives per stakeholders was quite high and these
representatives come from different countries all over the world
(ranging from Brazil to Japan and from Norway to South Africa)
we had to follow a more pragmatic procedure to build the
consensus score. This procedure is based on statistical measures
like the median and is illustrated in Table 4.
The cells in Table 4 (except those on the first row and first
column) represent the number of stakeholder representatives
that assigned the respective score category to the importance
level of the respective criteria. For instance, from a total of
57 representatives from the stakeholder “Providers” that gave
a score to the criterion “Predictability” (C1), 30 representatives
placed this criterion in the category “very important,” 22
placed it in the category “important,” 2 placed it in the
category “no effect” and no representative placed it in the
category “low importance” and 3 representatives placed it in
the category “very low importance” (see Table 4, Part A, first
row below header row). The score category that contains the
median value has been shaded in Table 4. For instance, as
regards C1 (Predictability) scored by 57 representatives from
the stakeholder “Providers” (i.e., Part A of Table 4), the
middle value (i.e., the median) corresponds to the 29th score
(when ordered) and this score falls within the category “very
important.”
The calculation of the criteria priorities or weights in the AHP
has thus been based on the median value. The idea behind this
is that if all stakeholder representatives had to come together in a
meeting to obtain a consensus on the final score category to assign
to the importance of the criteria (e.g., using a voting procedure),
the consensus solution that would have emerged out of this
meeting would be very close to the median score. If necessary,
a sensitivity analysis will be performed where we will test to what
extent the final ranking of the final alternative solutions might
change when other weight sets were used.
The final relative priorities for the criteria are shown in Table 5
for the four stakeholders. These are based on the median value of
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FIGURE 6 | Prioritization of DP5 options (Regulatory mechanism). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view,
(D) collections point of view.
the stakeholder representatives’ scores. For instance, as regards
the stakeholder “Providers,” the median value of stakeholder
representatives’ scores for C1 to C5 is “very important” (see
Table 4, Part A) and – based on pairwise comparisons at the
level of the score categories (Table 3, Part A) – the category
level “very important” obtained a relative priority of 0.527 in
Table 3, Part B. For the criteria C6 to C11 the median value
(in Table 4, Part A) is “important” which corresponds with
a relative priority of 0.249 (in Table 3B). These values were
finally normalized (i.e., divided by their total sum, which is
5 × 0.527 + 6 × 0.249 = 4.129). Consequently, the relative
priority of C1 (and also C2. . .C5) in Table 5 (Part A) is
0.527/4.129 = 0.128 and the relative priority of C6 (and also
C7. . .C11) is 0.249/4.129 = 0.060.
However, in some cases, e.g., when two scores share the
middle position in the stakeholder representatives’ rankings, a
compromise has been made. For instance, as regards the criterion
“Transparency” (C3) for the stakeholder “Academic users” (in
Table 4B), there is an even number of scores (46) and in that
case both the 23th and the 24th score share the middle position.
However, the former falls within the category “very important”
and the latter within the category “important.” In this case the
geometric mean of both the relative priorities associated with
these score categories (from Table 3B) was given to this score,
namely (0.527× 0.249)1/2 = 0.362 and this result was then used as
input into the normalization process described above but applied
to the stakeholder “Academic users.” Hence, the criterion C3
obtains, from Academic users’ perspective, a normalized relative
priority of 0.362/(0.527 × 4 + 0.362 × 1 + 0.249 × 6) = 0.091.
The geometric mean was used here (as suggested by Saaty, 1995,
pp. 265) as we are calculating the average of ratios.
Prioritization of the design parameters
The prioritization of the design parameters in terms of the criteria
to which they contribute (as visualized in Figure 1) was done in
a comparable way to the prioritization of the criteria in terms of
the stakeholders’ objectives. The difference, however, is that the
evaluations of the options for the design parameters were not
based on a large survey, but directly based on expert judgment. To
this end, an expert rated the options in terms of their contribution
to the criteria considered relevant by the stakeholders.
The stakeholder survey conducted in Sirakaya (2019a)
included a question on the participant’s availability for an in-
depth interview regarding ABS options. A total of 53 of the
220 respondents demonstrated their interest and 20 ended up
participating to the interview. The distribution of the participants
amongst the stakeholder groups has proven to be rather
homogenous as five experts represented provider countries, six
experts represented collections, five represented industrial users
and four represented academic users. Written informed consent
forms were obtained from all of these experts.
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FIGURE 7 | Prioritization of DP6 options (Granting authority). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view,
(D) collections point of view.
The analysis and scoring of the interview results derive from
both the literature review in Sirakaya (2019a) and the interview
analysis in Sirakaya (2019b). Since the interviewees were initially
the respondents to the surveys related to ABS goals, their
perception of the effect of the regulatory options on the goals has
not been difficult to obtain. Where the number of responses was
not sufficient, an additional literature review has been conducted
with the aim of aiding the scoring phase.
For instance, when scoring stakeholders’ views on DSI in the
light of ABS criterion N◦7 (scientific research on GR), we have
utilized much of the related literature (Vogel, 2011; Bagley and
Rai, 2013; Lawson and Rourke, 2016; Devi and Pisupati, 2018;
Wynberg and Laird, 2018; Flach et al., 2019; Geary and Bubela,
2019; Watanabe, 2019) to fine-tune our conclusions about how
regulating DSI in the same manner as GR would negatively
impact scientific research activities including those conducted in
provider countries. The fact is that providing access in a timely
manner would be challenging and track and trace would be
inefficient for both the users and providers.
Likewise, when refining our conclusions related to the
temporal scope, as well as the activity scope, and the implications
on criteria N◦1 (predictability), N◦2 (legal certainty) and N◦3
(transparency) thereof, we resorted to many sources of literature
(Seiler and Dutfield, 2001; Orsini et al., 2008; Andersen et al.,
2010; Schei and Tvedt, 2010; Oliva, 2011; Coolsaet and Pitseys,
2014; Morgera et al., 2014; Prip and Rosendal, 2015; Wyss, 2017)
in order to be able to rank the best option to enable the attainment
of these goals. The diversity in our literature sources allowed us
to enrich our conclusions regarding stakeholder opinion.
The scores that finally resulted from the procedure described
above and that express the contribution of the different options
within each single DP (like DP1A, DP1B, DP1C; DP2A, . . ., DP10B)
to the 11 criteria (C1,. . .,C11) are given in Table 6.
Calculation of the overall relative priorities of design
parameters per stakeholder
The final step of the prioritization procedures is to calculate the
relative priorities of the final options for the design parameters
in terms of their contribution to the stakeholder objectives. This
will be done in the manner explained in section “The Use of
the Pairwise comparison Mechanism in AHP (in General)” (and
according to Eq. 1). Here, two steps can be identified. The first
step comprises the prioritization of the different options for the
design parameters (DP) in terms of the 11 criteria identified. For
instance, regarding DP1 (Material scope), there are three options,
namely: “in situ access” (DP1A), “in situ and ex situ access” (DP1B)
and “in situ, ex situ, and for DSI” (DP1B) and these three options
need to be prioritized in terms of their contribution to the 11
criteria identified (C1. . .C11). The same exercise needs to be done
for the options (A, B, . . .) within the remaining DP (DP2. . .DP10)
and for all of the 11 criteria. For instance, also DP2A, DP2B and
DP2C need to be compared in terms of their contribution to the
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FIGURE 8 | Prioritization of DP7 options (Standardization). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view, (D) collections
point of view.
11 criteria. As far as the prioritization of the DP options in terms
of the 11 criteria is concerned, the prioritization is based on the
(ordinal) performance levels (score categories) of the options,
i.e., the five-point ordinal scale (++/+/0:−/− −) subsequently
transformed into ratio scales according to the same method as
explained in section “General” (Table 3B). The results of these
can be read off from Figures 2–11 (as will be explained below).
The second step is to conduct an analysis from each separate
stakeholder’s point of view. This means that the different DP
options need to be prioritized in terms of their contribution to
the overall objectives of each stakeholder group, as measured
by the stakeholder criteria (and their associated weights). More
concretely, this means that the prioritizations of the DP options
need to be combined with the criterion priorities or weights
as derived in section “Building Consensus Among Stakeholder
Representatives’ Scorings” and shown in Table 5.
The results are shown in Figures 2–11 for the 10 DP studied in
this report, for each of the four single stakeholder group’s point
of view separately (industrial users, academic users, collections
and provider states). For instance, Figure 2 shows the priorities
of the three options for DP1 (Material Scope), namely: “In situ
access only” (DP1A), “In situ and ex situ access” (DP1B) and
“In situ, ex situ, and access for DSI” (DP1C). The 11 criteria
(C1. . .C11) are represented on the horizontal axis, and their
weights are visualized by the height of the vertical bars starting
at the criterion’s name. The value of these weights is to be read off
from the left vertical axis. For instance, the criterion Predictability
(C1) has a weight (or priority) of 0.129. The (colored) lines
from left to right represent the alternatives (or here: the DP
options: DP1A, DP1B, DP1C). The intersection between these
(colored) lines from left to right and the vertical lines starting
at the criterion’s name represent the priority (i.e., the score) of
that alternative (c.q. DP option) on that specific criterion. The
value of this priority is to be read off from the right vertical
axis. For instance, DP1A (and also DP1B) obtain a priority of
0.405 on the criterion Predictability (C1). Finally, the priority
of the DP options in terms of all the 11 criteria taken together
(and weighted) are given by the intersection of the (colored)
lines from left to right with the right vertical axis. For instance,
DP1A (“in situ access only”) obtains a score of 0.430 (in Part A
of Figure 2). This score represents the overall relative priority
of DP1A but only in terms of the industrial user’s perspective.
A similar approach is followed from the other stakeholder groups’
perspective (shown in Part B, C and D of Figure 2). A particular
feature of the analysis of the DP options for the design of ABS
frameworks here is that the criteria that are considered relevant
by the stakeholder groups are the same for all the four stakeholder
groups. This also implies that the scores (priorities) of the DP
options will be the same for a particular criterion, irrespective
of the point of view from which this criterion is used. Only
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FIGURE 9 | Prioritization of DP8 options (Mandatory local partner). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view,
(D) collections point of view.
the criteria weights (as visualized by the height of the vertical
bars starting at the criteria’s name) differ among the stakeholder
groups and of course also the scores that the DP options obtain
on the different criteria differ from the same stakeholder point of
view (but not across stakeholder points of view). A consequence
of this peculiarity is that the differences between the four parts (A,
B, C, D) of Figure 2 are rather small, only the intersections of the
(colored) lines from left to right with the right vertical axis differ.
In other words, only the overall relative priorities differ between
the stakeholder points of view, because the criterion weight sets
differ between the stakeholders.
Consequently, the level of conflict between the stakeholder
priorities will be relatively low. Regarding ABS systems, the four
stakeholders consider the same group of criteria as relevant to
them, but to a different extent (i.e., with different weights).
This finding may be peculiar to the access component of ABS
agreements to GR, but it is doubtful whether this is the case
for benefit-sharing agreements. Here, one might expect that the
degrees of conflict between stakeholders will be higher.
The low level of conflict between the stakeholders is because,
in essence, all of the stakeholders strive to have a system
that provides them with the clarity, legal certainty and cost-
effectiveness they require in order to either make an informed
decision (in the case of providers) or obtain access to GR in a
lawful and timely manner (Kamau et al., 2010; Greiber et al., 2012;
Kohsaka, 2012; Kariyawasam and Tsai, 2018). Secondly, all
stakeholders share the same criteria set as the criteria derive from
international legal documents on ABS that set out the general
principles for the national ABS systems. This means that all of
the national ABS systems should be designed in a way that will
achieve these goals, notwithstanding the fact that some goals
may be of less importance for some stakeholders than others.
Therefore, if these preferred regulatory options are implemented
at the national level, the level of conflict occurring in such a
system is expected to be low.
This, nevertheless, is unlikely to be the case concerning
benefit-sharing. The data obtained during the previous study
(Sirakaya, 2019a) on benefit-sharing based on stakeholder
interviews demonstrates that most of the users’ interests clash
with those of the providers especially in terms of a higher level
of conflict between industrial users and provider countries.
As far as the material scope of an ABS framework (DP1) shown
in Figure 2, is concerned, none of the stakeholders prefers the
DP1C option (in situ, ex situ access for DSI). Only in relation to C8
(Strengthen IPLC) and C9 (Technology transfer and cooperation)
do the scores of DP1C match with these of DP1A and DP1B. For all
the other criteria the scores of DP1C are lower than those of DP1A
and DP1B. Hence, a relation of “weak dominance” exists between
DP1A and DP1B on the one hand and DP1C on the other hand.
All stakeholders prefer DP1A or DP1B and the difference between
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FIGURE 10 | Prioritization of DP9 options (Facilitated access for non-commercial research). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view,
(C) provider point of view, (D) collections point of view.
these two is very small (from an industrial user point of view both
DP options even score the same). Hence, the conclusion here is
that the stakeholders prefer ABS frameworks to cover “in situ
access” (DP1A) or “in situ and ex situ access” (DP1B). On the
other hand, a majority of the stakeholders does not favor DSI
being covered by the same obligations as those that are imposed
on in situ or ex situ access. As stated in section “Prioritization
of the Design Parameters,” this is because all stakeholders benefit
from accessing DSI, it would bear high costs for all stakeholders
to subject DSI to the same access conditions as GR.
In the approach described above (and that will also be followed
below), the options for the design parameters play an important
role in the design of specific types of ABS frameworks to GR. Such
an approach relies heavily on what Keeney (1996) categorized as
“value-focused thinking,” a process approach focusing on eliciting
the decision makers’ values or criteria prior to identifying the
alternatives. It is only at the next stage that one proactively
attempts to identify concrete actions (here: combinations of
specific DP options across DP) that can contribute to these
predefined values. The set of alternatives is thus said to be
“constructed,” instead of being determined externally. By making
values explicit and structuring them, it becomes possible to
“expand” the feasible set and consider alternatives that were not
there at the beginning of the process and yet appear desirable
and feasible within the value structure. The value-focused
thinking approach sharply contrasts with the “alternative-focused
thinking” approach, whereby alternatives are identified at an
early stage in the decision-making process and the focus is on
distinguishing and choosing between these alternatives. In that
case, the pre-defined set of alternatives fundamentally constrains
the evaluation process, because it anchors (or even freezes) the
thought process, stifling creativity and innovation.
Regarding the temporal scope of ABS frameworks (DP2),
presented in Figure 3, a similar degree of unanimity among
stakeholder groups exists, but now in favor of the DP2B option.
This option even strongly dominates the two other options (DP2A
and DP2C), which even obtain the same score on all criteria.
Hence, the conclusion here is that future ABS frameworks will
need to be designed in terms of “access for utilization” (DP2B)
and not in terms of “access for sampling” (DP2A) or “access to
previously obtained GR for new utilization” (DP2C) to fulfill the
objectives of all stakeholder groups.
Regarding the Material scope (DP3) presented in Figure 4 the
level of conflict between the separate criteria is a little higher, but
not when all criteria are taken together (i.e., in the overall view
per stakeholder). According to each stakeholder point of view the
DP3B option (“Development”) is the most preferable, followed
by the DP3A (“Research”) and the DP3C option (“Research and
Development”). The good overall score of DP3B here can largely
be attributed to the high score on C7, C6 and C3. Hence, it makes
Frontiers in Genetics | www.frontiersin.org 17 December 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 549836
fgene-11-549836 December 2, 2020 Time: 13:59 # 18
Sirakaya et al. Designing Regulatory Frameworks for Access to Genetic Resources
FIGURE 11 | Prioritization of DP10 options (Renegotiability). (A) Industrial user point of view, (B) academic user point of view, (C) provider point of view,
(D) collections point of view.
sense to test the sensitivity of the result for variations in the
weight of these criteria. A sensitivity analysis revealed that the
final score of the DP3B option is insensitive to (small) changes in
the weights of the criteria C7, C6 and C3. Only in the event that
the weight of C7 was reduced from 0.129 to less than 0.030 (i.e.,
dividing the weight by a factor 4.3) would DP3B be outperformed
by DP3A and this outperformance would only be very small and
it would occur only in terms of the industrial user point of view
(and not in terms of the other stakeholders’ point of view).
Here again, the conclusion is that ABS frameworks should be
designed along the lines of the DP3B option (i.e., focusing on
“Development”) in order to be consistent with the objectives of
all stakeholder groups.
Regarding the Conditions of access (DP4), presented in
Figure 5, the level of conflict between the separate criteria is
very low. The DP4A option (which includes mandatory BSA)
outperforms the DP4B option (where BSA is non-mandatory)
(or yields at least an equal score) on all separate criteria,
except the cost-effectiveness criterion (C6). In the overall view
per stakeholder (i.e., all criteria taken together within each
stakeholder view), the DP4A option is the preferred option of each
stakeholder. The sensitivity of this result is very low. The weight
of the C6 criterion would hypothetically need to be increased to
about 0.318 (and from some stakeholder points of view to an
even higher level) before rank reversal would occur. This is an
increase by a factor of 2.4 from the academic user point of view;
from the other viewpoints, the increase would need to be even
higher (e.g., a factor 5.74), which is very unrealistic. Hence one
can conclude that the final result is rather insensitive to changes
in the weights. In other words, sensitivity is low, which can be
interpreted as a benefit.
Here again, the conclusion is that ABS frameworks should
be designed along the lines of the DP4A option (whereby
BSA is mandatory) to be consistent with the objectives of all
stakeholder groups.
Regarding the type of regulatory mechanism (DP5), presented
in Figure 6, again, the level of conflict between the separate
criteria is quite low. The DP5B option (i.e., with permit-
based access) outperforms the DP5A option (with notification-
based access) or yields at least an equal score on all separate
criteria but two. The two so-called “discordant” criteria are
C6 (Cost-effectiveness) and C7 (Scientific Research). On these
criteria, the DP5A option is the preferred option and the
score difference is rather high on C6 and somewhat lower
on C7. In terms of the overall view per stakeholder (i.e.,
all criteria taken together within each stakeholder view),
the DP5B option, however, remains the preferred option of
each stakeholder.
The sensitivity of this result is rather low, but not as low
as in the case of DP4. The weight of the C6 criterion would
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hypothetically need to be multiplied by a factor of 1.88 before
rank reversal would occur from the academic user point of
view. From the other viewpoints, the hypothetical increase needs
even to be stronger for rank reversal to occur (the highest
increase being by a factor of 4.26 from the industrial user
point of view). As regards the C7 criterion, rank reversal would
only occur with an increase of the C7 weight by a factor of
2.41 from the academic user point of view (or even higher
in the case of e.g., the provider point of view, namely by a
factor of 6.07).
However, if both the C6 and the C7 weights were increased
simultaneously, rank reversal would occur somewhat more
quickly. For instance, from the academic user point of view,
an increase of both weights simultaneously by a factor of 1.46
would already result in rank reversal (i.e., DP5A being preferred
over DP5B instead of the other way around), but from the
other points of view an increase by a higher factor is needed to
cause rank reversal.
Here again, the conclusion is that ABS frameworks should
be designed along the lines of the DP4B option (i.e., with
permit-based access) to be consistent with the objectives of all
stakeholder groups.
Regarding the options related to the Granting authority (DP6),
presented in Figure 7, there is no conflict at all, neither between
the separate criteria within each stakeholder perspective, nor
between the stakeholder points of view (whereby all criteria are
taken together after weighing them). In all cases the DP6A option
(whereby one centralized single institution is responsible for
granting the permits) is the preferred option. On 6 of the 11
criteria, however, this option scores the same as the alternative
option, but in terms of the stakeholder points of view DP6A
remains in all cases the preferred option.
Regarding Standardization (DP7), presented in Figure 8,
there is a very small level of conflict between the criteria.
For 9 of the 11 criteria DP7A and DP7B score the same.
For the criterion C4 (Fairness and Equity) DP7B outperforms
DP7A and on criterion C6 (Cost-Effectiveness), it is the other
way around. Moreover, some level of conflict exists between
the stakeholder points of view. All stakeholder points of view
favor the DP7B option (i.e., the case-by-case variant), except
the academic user point of view that favors DP7A (i.e., the
standardized variant), but the differences are really very small
so that academic users might not have a big problem with
the DP7B option. However, the results are quite sensitive to
changes in the weights of C4 and C6. A sensitivity analysis
revealed that small changes in C4 and C6 may lead to a
rank reversal of DP7B and DP7A, particularly in terms of the
academic user point of view. On the other hand, this finding
reinforces the argument that academic users may not have a
big problem when the DP7B option would be chosen instead of
DP7A option.
Regarding DP8 options (i.e., whether a local partner should
be mandatory), DP8B (i.e., no local partner mandatory) is the
preferred option, as shown in Figure 9. There is, however, some
conflict between the criteria, but not between the stakeholder
points of view. The majority of the criteria support the DP8B
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(mandatory local partner), namely C8 (strengthen IPLC), C9
(Technology transfer) and C10 (Incentives for biodiversity). As
the weight of these criteria is not very high, a sensitivity analysis
may be useful in this case.
Here, the sensitivity analysis revealed that the result
is relatively insensitive to a hypothetical increase in the
weights of these criteria taken separately (i.e., either C8,
C9 or C10). The weight of these criteria would need to
be increased more than fourfold (more precisely to at least
0.360 and for some stakeholders even to 0.450), which is
very unrealistic, before rank reversal would occur. And when
the weights of all these so-called “discordant” criteria (i.e.,
C8, C9 and C10) were increased simultaneously, then the
sensitivity analysis revealed that even for a doubling of
these three criterion weights simultaneously, rank reversal
still does not occur.
Regarding the DP9 options (i.e., whether access should be
facilitated for non-commercial research), Figure 10 shows that
there is unanimity both in terms of the criteria separately
as well as in terms of the stakeholder points of view that
access should be facilitated for non-commercial research (i.e.,
the DP9A option). The only nuance that should be made
here is that both options score the same on 5 of the
11 criteria. Hence, in terms of the separate criteria DP9A
weakly dominates DP9B, but in terms of the stakeholder
points of view (i.e., comprising all the criteria aggregated
within each single stakeholder group separately), there is
strong dominance.
Regarding the DP10 options (i.e., whether the agreement
should be renegotiable when either user or intent changes)
there is, according to Figure 11, again unanimity both in
terms of the criteria separately as well as in terms of the
stakeholder points of view that the option “when user changes”
(i.e., the DP10A option) is preferable to the option “when
intent changes” (i.e., the DP10B option). Again, the nuance
that needs to be made is that both options score the same
on 5 of the 11 criteria. Hence, in terms of the separate
criteria DP10A weakly dominates DP10B, but in terms of the
stakeholder points of view (i.e., comprising all the criteria
aggregated within each single stakeholder group separately),
there is strong dominance.
CONCLUSION
Table 7 shows the optimal options for the parameters that
have been identified for the design of ABS frameworks for
GR, following a “value-focused thinking” approach (as defined
by Keeney, 1996). The top row of Table 7 shows the 10
design parameters (DP1. . .DP10). Consequently, each column
corresponds to a separate design parameter and comprises the
different possible options (A, B, C) for these design parameters
(shown by the rows). The DP options (i.e., the options within
each separate DP) that command the highest priority are shaded.
For instance, as regards DP2 (Temporal scope), it is DP2B (Access
for utilization) that commands the highest priority. When two
options have been shaded within the same column, this means
that both options are ranked (more or less) the same in terms
of all the stakeholder groups. For instance, as regards DP1
(Material scope), both DP1A (In situ access) and DP1B (In situ
access and ex situ access) obtain nearly the same priority and
the difference between the stakeholder groups is very low (as
shown in Figure 2). For DP10 (Renegotiability) both options
are non-exclusive, which means that the implementation of one
of the options does not exclude the implementation of the
other option. As they are ranked the same, one could advise
integrating both options into the design of the ABS frameworks
to be worked out.
As regards the material scope (DP1), the results show that
the majority of the stakeholders do not prefer the DSI to
be regulated in the same way as GR is, whereas they agree
with the regulation of in situ and ex situ access. Regarding
temporal scope (DP2), the stakeholders prefer the trigger
to be utilization as that would provide them with higher
levels of clarity and legal certainty. Especially for provider
countries, the cost of monitoring and tracking access would be
significantly lower.
Results on DP3 demonstrate that the majority of the
stakeholders prefer development to be the trigger for access
requirements whereas R&D is the least preferred option. This is
because the term R&D is not clear-cut and the start of R&D is not
apparent in each case.
Regarding DP4, the majority prefers mandatory benefit-
sharing agreements as the level of legal certainty is much higher
for both the users and providers. This is due to the fact that both
parties would be able to operate knowing that the activity is in
compliance with what the law prescribes. Similar concerns arise
in the case of options regarding the granting authority (DP6) as
both the users and the providers prefer a one-stop shop.
DP5 demonstrates a slight difference between the point of
view of the industrial and academic users. Whereas the academic
users prioritize speed in order to advance in scientific research,
industrial users value legal certainty and prefer permits over
notifications in order to make sure they have complied with the
necessary requirements from the beginning in order to prevent
jeopardizing the entire R&D project.
One option the stakeholders did not have a full consensus
on is standardization (DP7). Many of the stakeholders did
prefer standard terms in terms of cost-effectiveness and legal
certainty, yet at the same time they found this to have a
lower level of fairness in terms of its flexibility, negotiability
and adaptability to the situation at hand. Nonetheless, the
stakeholders appreciated some level of standardization with
the option to tweak the terms to fit a certain situation. The
same flexibility is also preferred when it comes to DP10 as
stakeholders do appreciate permission from the regulatory
framework regarding the adaptability of contracts to newly
occurring situations such as discovery of a new lead or newly
established public-private partnerships.
The sensitivity analysis conducted within DP8 demonstrated
that all stakeholders prefer the option “no mandatory local
partner” in the light of the criteria, including provider countries.
This result differs from those displayed under Sirakaya (2019b)
where the provider countries preferred the option of imposing
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mandatory local partners. This may be due to the criteria that play
a bigger role in our current research.
DP9 portrays a rather straightforward dominance of
facilitating access to non-commercial research over non-
facilitated access. This is because all stakeholders, including
regulators from provider countries see the benefit of research
collaborations between the users and provider countries
and therefore do want to continue supporting foreign
researchers’ interests.
As the level of conflict between the stakeholder priorities was
very low in this MCA application, it is not useful to further
differentiate the priorities of the DP options according to the
stakeholder point of view. Only from the academic point of
view was a slightly different ranking of DP options obtained,
but the differences were either very small (and often due to
the score on one specific criterion) or it occurred only after
applying sensitivity analysis (i.e., hypothetically changing the
criterion weights).
The reason why the level of conflict between stakeholder
preferences is rather low is that the four stakeholder groups
consider the same group of criteria to be relevant to
them. Only the extent to which these criteria are relevant
to them (i.e., the criterion weights) differs between the
stakeholders. We assume that this finding may be a peculiar
one to ABS frameworks, but that it will no longer be
valid for the case of benefit-sharing. Here, one might
expect that the degrees of conflict between stakeholders will
be higher. Future MCA research, focused on the design
of benefit-sharing agreements, will tell us whether this
assumption is valid.
The preliminary research (Sirakaya, 2019a) demonstrated
that stakeholders significantly differ in their perceptions and
preferences toward different benefit-sharing options, although, as
displayed in the previous research and solidified with the results
of this MCA, stakeholders are much more likely to agree on
the commonly used regulatory options on access. This does not
mean that the current national ABS frameworks do not result in
conflicts. The results of the present research validate that there
are options on access that stakeholders can agree on, and if these
options are clustered in an ABS framework, the majority of the
stakeholders will be able to operate under the law much more
smoothly than when the favorable options are placed together
with unfavorable ones.
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